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The distribution of school funding and inputs in England: 1993-2013
Introduction
Spending on schools represents a large and growing share of public service spending in England. In 2012-13, total spending on schools represented ¿57 billion or about 23% of total service spending in England 1 excluding social protection (the 2nd largest component of public service spending behind health) 1 . School spending per pupil grew by an average of over 5% per year in real-terms between 1999-00 and 2009-10 (Chowdry et al. (2010) ). Since 2010, it has been protected in real-terms, in spite of large cuts to other areas of public expenditure. Understanding how this extra spending translated into funding for dierent types of schools and overall inputs can provide valuable insights. First, from a taxpayer perspective, it is important to understand what the large increase in spending delivered in terms of extra inputs and whether this represented value for money. Second, the extent to which dierent types of schools received dierent levels of funding shows us how the shape of the state education system in England is changing, particularly as the increases were targeted at more disadvantaged schools. Third, as schools in England possess relatively large levels of budgetary autonomy 2 , it can provide valuable lessons for the way schools -and public sector bodies more generally -make nancial decisions within a highly decentralised decision-making system.
The main contribution of this paper is to link together two decades worth of data on school characteristics, funding and inputs for schools in England to show how the distribution of funding and inputs has changed across schools over time.We nd that funding per pupil increased substantially between 1999-00 and 2012-13. However, it also became more varied across schools, with higher levels of funds targeted at deprived pupils. Real-terms increases in funding per pupil were much larger for the most deprived quintile of primary and secondary schools (83% and 93%, respectively) as compared with the least deprived quintile of primary and secondary schools (56% and 59%). We decompose these increases in funding per pupil into the amount explained by quantities of dierent types of sta per pupil, their price and changes in non-stang costs. We nd that some of these increases in funding per pupil translated into larger numbers of teachers per pupil and a higher real-terms cost per teacher (about 20-30% of the increase in funding per pupil). However, a much larger portion of the increases in funding can be accounted for by higher levels and increased variation in the use of teaching assistants (largely lower skilled sta ), other non-teaching sta and non-sta inputs (such as learning resources, professional services and energy). Furthermore, there is also evidence to suggest that dierences in expenditure between more deprived and less deprived schools are smaller than dierences in funding, with more deprived secondary schools running slightly larger surpluses.
What drove these changes and what lessons do they provide for the way schools make nancial decisions? Policymakers actively encouraged schools to make more use of non-teaching sta over this period in the belief that it could help achieve educational or wider social objectives, and changes in educational need may have required increased use of teaching assistants (such as greater numbers of pupils with English as an Additional Language). However, it is not clear that policymakers ever intended the scale of the shift we observe and it is unlikely to have been driven by robust empirical evidence, as little was available at the time. Indeed, the evidence that now exists suggests that teaching assistants have had a weak eect on pupil attainment (at best), though this could be due to poor training and deployment. We instead argue that the main factors driving increased use of non-teaching sta and non-sta expenditures are the various rigidities schools face when making nancial decisions and the short-run nature of funding allocations that encourages greater use of exible inputs. Furthermore, schools are now likely to be better informed on the empirical evidence with regards to teachers and teaching assistants, but have yet to respond either in terms of sta composition or the way teaching assistants are used. 1 Author's calculations using PESA (2014), Table 10 .1 2 OECD Education at a Glance (2012) 2 These ndings are highly relevant to present policy debates in schools. The pupil premium represents a xed amount of extra funding targeted at disadvantaged pupils. As such, it represents a continuation of the long-term trend of targeting more funding at schools containing larger numbers of disadvantaged pupils.
Schools have also been granted more autonomy. Indeed, schools that have converted to Academy status (over half of all secondary schools) have the freedom to deviate from national pay and conditions. However, academies have made limited use of these freedoms to date and there remains uncertainty with respect to future levels of funding. This might lead us to expect the pupil premium to be used in similar ways to previous increases in deprivation funding, with some uncertainty as to how academies may have responded.
This work ts into a number literatures on school nance, the eects of school resources and the way schools make nancial decisions. A number of previous papers have documented the extent to which school funding is targeted at deprived schools in England (West et al. (2001) ; West (2009) ; Chowdry and Sibieta (2011) ). We show how these patterns have changed dramatically over a long time frame. Other countries such as the Netherlands have also chosen to focus funding on deprived schools (de Haan (2014); Leuven et al. (2007) ). However, there is a large dierence with the US school nance literature, which has focused on equity issues that arise from dierences in tax bases across school districts (principally property tax bases) and the eects of school nance equalization programmes on resources and attainment (Silva and Sonstelie (1995) ; Hoxby (2001) ; Card and Payne (2002); Fernandez and Rogerson (2003) ; Verstegen and Jordan (2009) ). This issue is less relevant in England as funding for schools is almost entirely covered by grants from central government to local government (i.e. schools are nanced through general taxation).
There is a large literature on the eects of resources on pupil attainment. Hanushek (2003) reviews this literature and argues that there is no strong or consistent relationship between school resources and student achievement. He further argues that the lack of a consistent relationship almost certainly reects rigidities and a lack of strong incentives. This is consistent with our view that increased employment of non-teaching sta was driven by such rigidities and that this may have limited the impact of the increase in resources on pupil attainment. In their review, Verstegen and King (1998) argue that ne resource decisions may matter more than overall levels of resources. Deploying teaching assistants in better ways may be one way to improve their impact. Grubb and Allen (2011) further argue that schools might not possess sucient information and empirical evidence in order to make ecient decisions and this may also be an important determinant of the inconsistent relationship between resources and attainment. This was certainly the case in the late 1990s, but may be less so since the emergence of empirical evidence on the importance of teachers in the education production function over the 2000s.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an institutional background and the likely eects of these on the distribution of school funding and inputs. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents some summary statistics detailing how the distribution of funding and inputs across schools have changed over time. Section 5 provides a decomposition of how changes in funding have translated into changes in pay-per head and quantities of dierent sta, as well as non-sta costs. Section 6 concludes with the implications of the ndings for policymakers and future research.
2 Institutional Background
This section provides some key details about the school funding system in England and how specic rules and constraints may aect resource decisions.
In England, the school funding system is a two-stage process. In the rst stage, central government allocates grants to local authorities based on the number of pupils in the local authority and measures of educational need (with funds raised through general taxation). However, from 2004 onwards the main grant provided to local authorities (now the Dedicated School Grant) was largely uprated by a set percentage in per pupil terms. As a result, dierences in funding per pupil across local authorities largely reected historical dierences in funding per pupil from 2004 onwards (and probably earlier given the features of the previous system). In the second stage, local authorities use their own 'fair funding' formulae to allocate funds to schools in their area. These formulae often contain measures of deprivation and educational need (local authorities were obliged to include these from 2002-03 onwards (West, 2009) , though many already did).
In addition to this, increasing use was made of specic grants over the 2000s. These were grants provided directly from central government to individual schools on the basis of a set formula. They tended to be very focused on deprived schools, making the funding system more targeted at deprivation than it otherwise would have been (Chowdry et al. (2010) ). From 2010-11 onwards, these specic grants have been rolled into the main Dedicated Schools Grant. Since 2010-11, the coalition government has also introduced a disadvantaged pupil premium, which provides a xed amount of extra funding for pupil classied as disadvantaged (in 2014-15, these were ¿1,300 for pupils in primary schools who had been eligible for free school meals in the past six years and ¿935 for pupils in secondary schools). This has further added to funding targeted at deprivation.
This system gives rise to a number of key features. First, funding is strongly targeted at measures of social deprivation, which is the result of grants to local authorities accounting for social deprivation and local authorities' own formulae also including social deprivation as a factor. As we shall see later in section 3, this level of redistribution can be quite signicant. Furthermore, the addition of specic grants in the 2000s made the funding system more targeted at deprivation (Chowdry and Sibieta (2011) ). This contrasts quite sharply with the US system of school nance, which (historically at least) was largely nanced by local property taxes and resulted in dierences in funding based on local property values. This has given rise to a number of school nance equalization programmes and increases in state and federal grants (Hoxby (2001) ).
Second, the fact that funding is allocated to individual schools gives them signicant levels of budgetary autonomy. Indeed, schools in England have some of the highest levels of autonomy across OECD countries (OECD, 2012) . Schools began to be granted such autonomy after the introduction of Local Management in Schools in 1991, which for the rst time gave schools individual budgets and the freedom to make their own budgetary decisions. This was justied on the basis that individual schools are best placed to allocate resources in order to maximise educational performance. This autonomy has gradually been extended over time as more and more responsibilities were transferred from local authorities to schools. Importantly, it is schools themselves who make decisions on how many and which sta to hire (subject to some conditions, see below) and they also determine which other resources they purchase (e.g. books, ICT and professional services). This system therefore provides an ideal context for which to study how schools make their resources choices, especially given the large increases in funding seen over the 2000s.
However, the decisions on how to spend resources are not unconstrained. There are a number of rigidities and constraints that might sway resource decisions. The cost of employing teachers is the main cost incurred by schools, with about 440,000 full-time equivalent teachers in England in 2012, making up about 50% of the total school workforce and about a half of schools budgets. Furthermore, there are national pay and conditions for teachers in England, which govern their salary levels, other benets and contractual terms.
In principle, schools have discretion about how quickly their teachers move up the pay scale. In practice, during our period of interest, position on the pay scale was largely determined by years of experience. In addition, schools can choose to use some additional payments to pay teachers above the salary scales if they wish 3 , but these exibilities are relatively under-used by schools. The nancial and legal costs of making a teacher redundant are also signicant. One further limit on schools' ability to hire extra teachers is physical space. Most schools are close to physical capacity in terms of the number of pupils they can admit 4 , such that employing an extra teacher would often involve having to nd an additional classroom. However, capital spending is set by local and central government and at a relatively long lag. Taking on an extra teacher is thus a signicant and binding nancial decision for a school, and sometimes not even possible given physical space. This might discourage schools from using additional funding to expand expenditure on teachers.
There is much greater exibility with regards to the employment of non-teaching sta. The pay and conditions of non-teaching sta is determined locally and schools have freedom to employ sta on xed or temporary contracts. The previous Labour government established the School Support Sta Negotiating Body (SSSNB) in 2009 to review and establish national pay and conditions. However, this was quickly abolished by the coalition government, with pay and conditions remaining a local responsibility. Given the relative exibility with which they can be employed, it would not be surprising if schools used much of their increase in funding to expand the numbers of non-teaching sta.
The two main types of sta covered here are teaching assistants and other sta. Teaching assistants have varying roles, including: providing one-to-one support to individual pupils; providing support during lessons; and, providing administrative support for teachers. They are generally lower-skilled compared with teachers, with around two-thirds having qualications below degree-level (Cribb et al. (2014) ), and are generally paid less than teachers and the national average (median salary of around ¿16,000 for full-time sta in 2012 according to ASHE, compared with ¿30,000 and ¿37,000 for primary and secondary school teachers, respectively and a national median of ¿26,000 5 ). As we shall see, their numbers have also increased in recent years and there were about 230,000 full-time equivalent teaching assistants in 2012 (or about 25% of the school workforce). Other sta includes a combination of administrative sta, technicians, other education support sta and auxiliary sta 6 . Their numbers have also grown in recent years, with about 220,000 full-time equivalent sta in 2012 or just under 25% of the total school workforce.
A further important constraint on school decision-making is the timing of funding decisions. Over most of the period of study (the early 1990s through to present day), school funding levels were determined annually by central and local government. Many of the specic grants introduced during the 2000s were often temporary and regularly restructured, giving rise to further uncertainty. The main exception is 2007-3 Additional payments include recruitment and retention payments, teaching and learning responsibility payments and payments for teachers working with children with special educational needs.
4 https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/statistics-school-capacity 5 http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/ashe/annual-survey-of-hours-and-earnings/2012-revised-results/index.html 6 According to the the School Workfoce Census (https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/school-workforce-in-englandnovember-2013), in 2012 there were approximately 83,000 sta in administrative roles, 25,000 technicians, 30,000 other education support sta (such as matrons or chilcare sta) and 87,000 auxilliary sta (such as catering or school maintenance sta). All gures here are expressed in FTE terms. 5 2010 when schools were given three-year budgets. With this exception in mind, schools generally have little certainty over their budgets from year to year. Although various mechanisms were in place to give schools greater stability (such as the minimum funding guarantee, which guaranteed schools a minimum increase in per pupil funding), the frequency of reforms and changes to the school funding system means that schools have limited ability to predict their budgets in future years and the level of the minimum funding guarantee has also varied a lot from year to year. This uncertainty could further encourage schools to employ resources that allow more exibility, such as non-teaching sta and non-sta resources. It may also encourage them to build up precautionary savings and thus not spend their full allocation from government Similarly, an additional source of uncertainty concerns pupil numbers. Schools need to be condent pupil numbers will not fall if they choose to employ an extra teacher. However, variations in cohort size from year to year and parental preferences (partly driven by results and OFSTED ratings) may create uncertainty from the point of view of schools.
Finally, one very important recent change to the school system has been the very rapid expansion of the Academies programme. The number of Academies has expanded from around 200 schools in 2010 to reach over 3,800 schools in 2014 (and accounting for over half of all secondary schools). These are like US charter schools and have signicant freedom, both in terms of resources and curriculum. For instance, they do not have to follow national pay and conditions for teachers, though these freedoms have rarely been used in practice. Moreover, Academies face the same uncertainties over funding. Therefore, there are reasons to think Academies might make dierent decisions, but there are also similar constraints over funding as for maintained schools.
Data
Our main interest lies in analysing how funding and inputs have changed across dierent types of schools in England over time. This requires us to link together various administrative datasets on funding, inputs and school characteristics. We also use employee-level data in order to calculate average pay levels of dierent types of school sta. Here, we describe the dierent datasets we use, how they are linked together and some summary statistics based on the linked data.
Data sources
Data on school characteristics are taken from a combination of two dierent sources. The Local Education Authority School Information Service (LEASIS) contains data on school phase, governance and average pupil characteristics (number of pupils, proportion of pupils eligible for free school meals, proportion of pupil with special education needs, proportion of pupils with English as an additional language and other characteristics) and is available from January 1993 to January 2009. From January 2010 to January 2013, we make use of similar raw school-level data underlying annual statistics on pupils, schools and their characteristics 7 ); the only dierence with LEASIS is that small numbers are suppressed to prevent disclosure of personal data.
LEASIS also contains data on stang levels between January 1993 through to January 2010. For later years, we then make use of publicly available school-level data taken from the new School Workforce 7 e.g. https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/schools-pupils-and-their-characteristics-january-2013 6 Census 8 , which relates to November 2010 to November 2012. As we shall see, the gures for sta levels in 2010 are oddly low, which seems likely to be the result of the fact that the survey was still experimental.
Stang levels appear to be return to their pre-2010 trends from 2011 onwards.
In both data sources, we dene three dierent sta categories: teachers; teaching assistants; and, number of teaching assistants as dened within the data, to which we add unqualied/student teachers 10 .
These changing denitions do not appear to lead to major discontinuities in trends for the numbers of teaching assistants over time. We also dene other sta to be as consistent as possible over time. Before 2011, other sta are dened as the residual between total sta, teachers and teaching assistants. For 2011 and 2012, this is dened as a separate category and additionally includes auxiliary sta (such as caretakers).
This change in 2011 does lead to a small jump in numbers of other sta for primary schools, which we show in section 4 and account for in the decomposition in section 5.
Data on funding and expenditure per pupil is primarily taken from Section 251 (formerly Section 52)
outturn data for schools from nancial years 1999-00 through to 2012-13. These data list the total income and expenditure of all maintained schools in England, and from 2009-10 give spending on major categories at the school-level. Our main measure of funding is total funding from government grants (i.e. it excludes any self-generated income). Academies are missing from the data up to 2010, which is not major problem up to 2010 as their numbers were relatively small and were often brand new schools. However, this is a potential In order to decompose the change in funding into the amount explained by changes in stang levels and cost per head, we must also calculate the employer costs of dierent types of school sta over time. We do this using the Annual Survey of Hours of Earnings for 1999-00 through to 2012-13. Within each year of the data, we identify four types of school sta within the public sector: primary school teachers; secondary school teachers; teaching assistants; and, other school sta (based on anonymous employer identiers where there are more than two teachers). For all individuals included here, we then calculate their total employer cost as gross salary plus employer national insurance contributions based on the prevailing system during the year in question and reported employer pension contributions (2005-06 onwards, before 2005-06 this is based on scheme rules for teachers and the average employer contribution across other types of sta in the 8 https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/statistics-school-workforce 9 In the case of of 1993-2004 it is the sum of student/unqualied teachers, nursery assistants, language assistants, technical assistants, special needs support sta, other assistants. For 2008-2010, it is dened as the sum of student/unqualied teachers, teaching assistants, higher level teaching assistants, special needs support sta, bilingual support support, other ethnic minority support sta. 10 The pay levels of this latter group are more similar to that of teaching assistants than teachers, which is why they are grouped as such 11 https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/income-and-expenditure-in-academies-in-england-academic-year-2011-to-2012 November 2010 is linked to January 2011 and academic year 2010-11).
We focus on state-funded primary and secondary mainstream schools (ages 5-11 and 11-16, respectively). Middle schools are grouped with either primary or secondary schools;s depending on whether more pupils are of primary or secondary age. We exclude special schools and pupil referral units (which together accounted for about 7% of local authority funding for schools in 2012-13) and independent schools, whose numbers were broadly stable over this period. We also exclude schools that are newly opened or have the smallest numbers of pupils as these are likely to have very dierent stang/funding levels (the 1% of primary and secondary schools with the lowest numbers of pupils).
The linked school-level data over time is summarised in Table 1 for both primary schools (panel (a)) and secondary schools (panel (b)),which give the number of schools seen in LEASIS or its equivalent, the numbers with missing funding data, the numbers of Academies and some characteristics of the schools in the sample (average numbers of pupils, pupils eligible for free school meals, pupil: teacher ratios and funding per pupil).
As can be seen, the numbers of primary and secondary schools has been declining over time, reecting a more general decline in the pupil population. The number of schools with missing funding data is generally very small up to the late 2000s. The number is clearly higher for secondary schools, but this is mainly newly established Academies and which are missing from the funding data. The number with missing data rises quite strongly in 2011-12 and 2012-13, reecting lots of schools being mid-way through the Academy conversion process. However, the average characteristics of pupils within the linked data do not appear to show a jump or discontinuity in 2011-12. The average size of both primary and secondary schools has been rising gradually over time, whilst the proportion of children eligible for FSM declined prior to the Great Recession and has gradually increased since then. Pupil:Teacher Ratios have declined slightly over time for both primary and secondary schools. Funding per pupil rose substantially over the 2000s, rising by 69% in real-terms for primary schools and 72% for secondary schools between 1999-00 and 2012-13.
4 Changes in the distribution of funding and inputs over time
We now discuss changes in the distribution of funding over time and how this has fed through into changes in the distribution of stang inputs. In the next section, we present a more precise decomposition of how increases in funding across dierent groups of schools can be accounted for by changes in the quantity and prices of inputs over time.
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In Figure 1 , we show the distribution of funding per pupil for selected years between 1999-00 and 2012-13, which is shown separately for primary (panel (a)) and secondary schools (panel (b)). Two things become immediately clear. Firstly, the distributions have shifted rightwards over time as funding per pupil has risen strongly in real-terms over time. Secondly, there has been an increase in the dispersion of funding per pupil for both primary and secondary schools. In 1999-00, there was quite a tight distribution of funding per pupil. This has become much more varied by 2012-13.
With expenditure on teachers being the largest component of schools spending, to what extent have these changes in funding per pupil translated into changes in the pupil:teacher ratio? As can be seen in Figure   2 , pupil:teacher ratios have fallen slightly over time for both primary and secondary schools (by about 11%
and 12% at the mean, respectively). However, the falls are clearly a lot smaller than the increases in funding over this time and there is almost no increase in the dispersion of pupil:teacher ratios. The question is therefore which other inputs can account for the increases in overall funding and increased dispersion. ) show the median levels of dierent stang inputs per 100 pupils over time for primary and secondary schools, together with the 25th and 75th percentiles. We divide sta into three categories (teachers, teaching assistants and other sta ). Rather than pupil:sta ratios, we use sta per pupil as this allows for easier comparisons between the three sta types. As we have already seen, the numbers of teachers per pupil has increased slightly over time, but there has been no substantial increase in variation across schools. However, there have been very large increases in average levels and variation in the use of teaching assistants and other sta. Amongst primary schools, the number of teaching assistants has risen from around 1 per 100 pupils in the late 1990s to reach around 3.4 per 100 pupils in 2012-13, with substantial variation across primary schools in terms of the numbers of teaching assistants as well.
For secondary schools, the average levels and growth in the number of teaching assistants has been lower.
However, the numbers of teaching assistants has still grown from 0.4 to 1.8 teaching assistants per pupil between 1999-00 and 2012-13.
For secondary schools, there has been a larger increase in other types of sta, which has risen from around 1 per 100 pupils to just over 3 per 100 pupils over the same period. There is also large variation across secondary schools in terms of their use of other sta, with 75th percentile being nearly 50% higher than the 25th percentile. Primary schools make less use of other sta, with around 2 per 100 pupils in 2012-13, though these numbers have clearly also grown over time. However, there is also a clear discontinuity in 2011-12 when auxiliary sta were explicitly included in sta counts (it is uncertain how and whether they were counted before this date). This is particularly clear for primary schools and less so for secondary schools. To account for this discontinuity in later analysis, we assume that the growth in auxiliary sta has been the same as the growth in other sta for primary schools (excluding teachers and teaching assistants).
We do not perform this adjustment for secondary schools as it implies a very large drop in other sta in 2011-12, making it likely that auxiliary sta were at least partially covered in earlier data. As we mentioned earlier, there is a noticeable drop in teaching assistants and other sta in 2010-11, which seems likely to result from the experimental nature of the School Workforce Census in that year and data returns to pre 2010-11 shortly afterward.
Therefore, it seems as if a large part of the increased level and variation in funding can be accounted for by greater use and variation in the numbers of teaching assistants and other non-teaching sta. The former play a more important role for primary schools and the latter being more important for secondary schools.
We can also examine how the increased dispersion in funding translated into dierences across dierent groups of schools. Here, we see that the increased dispersion in funding per pupil can be in a large part explained by increased targeting of funding at more deprived schools. In Figure 4 (a) and (b) we split primary and secondary schools into quintiles of school-level deprivation based on the proportion of children eligible for free school meals each year. We then calculate how funding per pupil diers across these ve quintiles for selected years between 1999-00 and 2012-13. In 1999-00, there was already some degree of funding targeted at deprivation, with funding per pupil in the most deprived primary (secondary) schools being 17% (15%) greater than in the least deprived ones. However, between 1999-00 and 2012-13, funding per pupil rose much more strongly amongst the most deprived primary and secondary schools. Funding per pupil in the most deprived primary schools rose by 83% in real-terms between 1999-00 and 2012-13 and by 93% amongst the most deprived secondary schools. This is much higher than the equivalent, though also large, growth in funding per pupil at the least deprived primary (56%) and secondary (59%) schools. As a result, funding per pupil in the most deprived primary (secondary) schools was 38% (39%) greater than in the least deprived ones in 2012-13, a very substantial increase in the level of funds targeted at school deprivation. As can be seen, this increase in funding targeted at deprivation occurred both during the 2000s and after 2010-11 when the pupil premium was increased. The pupil premium seems to represent a continuation of this long-run trend, rather than a major shift.
Of course, the level of deprivation is not the only way in which schools dier. However, even if we account for other dierences in pupil intakes, regional dierences and school characteristics, we still see a very large increase in funding targeted at deprivation. Figure 5 shows the estimated increase in funding per pupil resulting from a one standard deviation increase in the proportion of pupils eligible for free school meals, after controlling for other characteristics of the school and pupil population. The responsiveness of school funding to deprivation clearly increases substantially over time, again particularly during the early 2000s and since the introduction of the pupil premium in 2010-11. At this point, it is worth noting that this may actually have caused additional uncertainty over funding for schools as more funding is determined by the types of pupils attending the school, which may change from year to year.
Decomposition of increase in funding
We now seek to decompose the extent to which increases in funding can be explained by changes in the quantities of stang inputs and changes in pay-per-head. We focus on changes in funding per pupil over the whole period covered by our data from 1999-00 through to 2012-13. This is largely data driven as school-level data on funding is not available before 1999-00. However, there was little average growth in sta inputs in the 1990s (as seen in Figure 3 ) and there was little growth in overall education spending grew little over the 1990s (Chowdry et al, 2010) . We are thus focusing on the period when schools spending rose markedly.
We focus on the overall change between 1999-00 and 2012-13 in the main results and compare results across schools facing dierent levels of deprivation (given that this is a major explanation for the increased variation in funding). Second, we assume that pay-per-head is constant across deprivation quintiles for each sta type. This is a necessary assumption given data on average teacher salaries by school is not available until 2010-11. It is a plausible assumption given national pay and conditions. However, pay and conditions do allow for some geographic variation to reect higher costs of living in the London area (Greaves and Sibieta, 2014) and schools tend to be more deprived in London. Salaries also vary with experience, particularly for teachers, and and more deprived schools have historically had younger teachers, on average. However, in the robustness checks, we show that average teacher salary levels do not vary substantially across deprivation quintiles, suggesting that the geographic and experience eects on teacher salaries largely cancel each other out in practice in terms of dierences across quintiles. We also present changes in teacher characteristics over time, which shows that teachers are gradually getting slightly younger and less experienced over time.
This suggests that we might be under-stating the rise in pay-per-head over time and over-stating the role of other factors. However, this is likely to be small given the relatively small changes in average teacher characteristics over time.
Third, we assume that all funding is spent on schooling inputs within the given year (i.e. no savings or borrowing by schools). This is plausible as schools are not able to borrow funds. However, they are able to carry surpluses over from one year to the next and these accumulated balances have become relatively signicant in recent years. In the robustness check, we show that these surpluses are relatively small for primary schools, but are slightly larger for secondary schools. Table 2 and 3 show the results of this decomposition for the changes in funding per pupil between 1999-00 and 2012-13 for primary and secondary schools across quintiles of school deprivation, respectively. We already saw the large change in funding per pupil for primary and secondary schools, with much larger increases in funding per pupil for the most deprived set of schools. The most deprived primary schools saw a real-terms (in 2012-13 prices based on the GDP deator) increase in funding of ¿2,300 (83%), whilst the most deprived secondary schools saw an increase of ¿3,400 (93%) Here, we show how much can be attributed to changes in the quantities of teachers, teaching assistants and other sta, their cost per head and non-stang costs.
Results
Starting with primary schools, although the increases in numbers of teachers seen earlier was relatively small, the fact that they are relatively expensive means that even a small increase accounts for a noticeable share of the increase in funding. Across quintiles, increased numbers of teachers account for about 12-15% of the increase in funding per pupil, with slightly larger absolute amounts for the more deprived primary schools. However, a much larger amount is explained by increased numbers of teaching assistants and other sta. For the most deprived primary schools, the amount explained by increased numbers of teaching assistants is just over ¿500 per pupil, while increased numbers of other sta per pupil explain just over ¿400
per pupil. Collectively, these two changes explain about 40% of the increase in funding per pupil between 1999-00 and 2012-13 for the most deprived schools. For less deprived schools, the share explained by nonteaching sta is higher, but the absolute amount is a lot lower, about ¿560 per pupil for the least deprived schools for non-teaching sta considered together. Increases in the real-terms cost-per-head of teachers explain a small but important amount of the increase in funding (about ¿200 across quintiles). The gures for other sta are relatively small as these are still fewer in number.
Considered together, increases in the quantity and price-per-head of these three sta types explain about 82% of the increase in funding per pupil for the least deprived primary schools and about 69% for the most deprived ones. The remainders are interpreted as reecting increases in non-sta costs, which are clearly most signicant for the most deprived primary schools. In summary, increases in the numbers and the cost of teachers explain a small, but noticeable amount of the increases in funding for primary schools.
However, a much larger amount can be explained by increases in the numbers of non-teaching sta and in non-sta expenditure. These latter factors can also explain a good deal of the increased targeting of funding at deprivation.
The results for secondary schools are generally similar, though there are some important dierences.
Firstly, the amount explained by higher quantities of teachers is slightly higher (about 13-17%). The absolute amount explained by higher numbers of teachers per pupil is also clearly higher for the most deprived secondary schools (about ¿550) than for the least deprived ones (¿250), showing that some of the increase targeting of funding at deprivation is being reected in higher numbers of teachers per pupil for secondary schools. However, we still see a much larger share and amount spent on non-teaching sta, particularly other sta (explaining 20-29% of the increase in funding per pupil). Collectively, increased numbers of nonteaching sta explain about ¿1,060 of the increased funding per pupil for deprived secondary schools (or around one third), with the majority explained by other sta rather than teaching assistants. For the least deprived secondary schools, this is lower at around ¿720, suggesting a large amount of the increase targeting 12 of funds at deprivation is being reected in higher numbers of non-teaching sta for secondary schools.
Increases in the cost of sta per head explain a similar amount in absolute terms for secondary schools as was the case for primary schools, with increases in the cost of teachers explaining the most here, reecting their higher numbers. The gures explained by increases in the cost-per-head of non-teaching sta play a very small role.
In total, a much smaller share of the increase in funding per pupil is explained by sta-costs than was the case for primary schools. About 61% for the most deprived secondary schools and about 74% for the least deprived ones. This would suggest that a much larger amount is explained by non-stang costs for secondary schools and that this also explains a large amount of the increases in funding for the most deprived secondary schools. We provide further detail in the next section to help interpret whether these results are plausible and the factors included in non-stang costs.
In summary, there have been large increases in funding per pupil over this period, particularly for the most deprived set of schools. A good proportion of these increases can be explained by increased numbers and costs of teachers. However, a much larger share can be explained by increased numbers of non-teaching sta (teaching assistants and other sta ) and expenditure on non-sta costs. Increases in expenditure on non-teaching sta and non-sta costs are also strongly graded by school deprivation, suggesting that it is these factors that explain the lion's share of the increased targeting of funding towards school deprivation.
Robustness checks
In order to aid interpretation of these results and test their robustness, we now present some further analysis of overall sta costs, expenditures and trends in teacher characteristics over time. Table 4 , in particular, presents how a number of dierent factors vary across school deprivation quintiles in 2012-13.
It is not currently possible to precisely calculate stang costs as a share of funding per pupil at the school-level. However, national average gures are available for primary and secondary schools, which we can compare against the gures for stang costs as a share of funding implied by our decomposition (actual sta levels multiplied by our estimated cost per head values). Table 4 thus shows the implied levels of stang costs as a share of funding as calculated in our decomposition, and how they vary across quintiles.
For secondary schools, the gures across quintiles are similar to the average gure of 78%. For primary schools, the implied results are slightly higher than the average gure of 79%. However, in both cases, we seem more likely to over-stating rather than under-stating stang costs and thus probably under-stating non-sta costs. Unfortunately, it is not possible to verify the variation across quintiles. The table also shows the actual teacher salary levels do not vary substantially across quintiles, suggesting that our assumption of no variation across quintiles is plausible.
In order to help understand the dierences in non-stang costs, we present ve major items of nonstang expenditure (energy, learning resources, ICT, services and other). Note that this is not the complete set of non-stang expenditure as items like catering and back-oce expenditure cannot be separated into stang and non-stang components. For both primary and secondary schools, learning resources (such as books) are clearly a large component of non-stang costs, with a bigger deprivation gradient for secondary than primary schools. Energy expenditure is also a relatively large component, with deprived primary schools spending noticeably more per pupil than less deprived ones (these dierences perhaps reecting the nature or age of the buildings). ICT and professional services are smaller components, with both showing a small deprivation gradient across primary and secondary schools. Other expenditure (not classied elsewhere) is then much larger for secondary schools, though is not particularly graded by deprivation for primary or secondary schools. In summary, non-stang costs includes a range of dierent expenditures, with all clearly graded by deprivation to some extent. The dierences by deprivation are largest for learning resources and professional services for both primary and secondary schools, with additional evidence of a clear dierence in energy costs for the most and least deprived primary schools.
Another potential concern is that the composition of the workforce is changing over time and this is biasing our estimates of the changes in pay-per-head over time. For example, if most of the increase in sta quantities can be accounted for by sta at below average cost (e.g. lots of young, inexperienced teachers) then our estimates of the change in cost-per-head will be biased downwards and we would not pick up as much of the increased quantity of young sta. Figure 6 shows the average age and tenure of teachers over time from Labour Force Survey. This shows that teachers have been getting slightly younger and less experienced over time. However, the changes are relatively small, with the average age of teachers falling from 42 in the late 1990s to 40 by 2013. This suggest that any bias is likely to be equally small.
One alternative explanation for the changes in non-stang costs by schools is that surpluses have increased, particularly for more deprived schools. Table 4 therefore shows dierences in total income per pupil (including self-generated income, around ¿200 per pupil), expenditure per pupil and implied surpluses per pupil across deprivation quintiles in 2012-13. As can be seen, there is evidence of small surpluses for primary schools, which do not vary substantially across quintiles. There is evidence of larger variation across secondary schools, with a surplus of around ¿100 per pupil for the least deprived schools and about ¿250
per pupil for the most deprived secondary schools. This suggests that dierences in surpluses do not play much of a role for primary schools. However, there are clear dierences between the least and most deprived secondary schools.
Summary and discussion of results
In summary, there were much larger increases in funding per pupil for the most deprived primary and secondary schools (¿2,300 and ¿3,400, respectively) over this period than was the case for least deprived primary and secondary schools (¿1,300 and ¿1,900, respectively). The decomposition has shown that that higher numbers of teachers per pupil and higher real-terms costs of teachers can account for a small, but notable, proportion of the increase in funding per pupil across primary and secondary schools (about 20-30% in total). However, these increases have not diered in absolute value by school deprivation, with the exception of a slightly larger amount explained by higher quantities of teachers per pupil for the most deprived secondary schools. A much larger proportion of the increase in funding per pupil across quintiles of social deprivation can be explained by increasing quantities of teaching-assistants and other sta per pupil (explaining about 40-44% of the increase in funding per pupil across primary schools and 31-38% across secondary schools). There are also strong dierences across quintiles in terms of the absolute amount, with increasing quantities of non-teaching sta accounting for about ¿930 of the increase in funding per pupil for the most deprived primary schools compared with ¿560 for the least deprived ones, and equivalent gures of ¿1,060 and ¿720 for the most and least deprived secondary schools. A large amount of the increase in overall funding, and in deprivation funding, translated into greater numbers of non-teaching sta per pupil. In addition to this, a substantial proportion of the increase in funding per pupil seems to have been reected in higher expenditures on non-stang inputs (such as ICT, energy, professional services and learning resources), with our robustness checks conrming that this is likely to represent a genuine increase.
Furthermore, for secondary schools, we think that some of the increasing dierence in funding in per pupil between the most and least deprived schools is not actually being reected in dierences in expenditure per pupil (the dierence in funding per pupil between the most and least deprived secondary schools was ¿2,000
per pupil in 2012-13, as compared with ¿1,800 in expenditure per pupil).
What drove these changes and what lessons do they provide for the way schools make nancial decisions? There are a number of possible explanations, which we think dier in their plausibility. Changes in educational need are likely to form part of the explanation. For instance, amongst the schools in our sample, the proportion of pupils with English as an Additional Language increased from 9% to 18% in primary schools between 1999-00 and 2012-13, and from 8% to 14% in secondary schools. Teaching assistants and other sta are used to support children with English as an Additional Language. However, this is certainly not their sole or main role. As a result, we think changes in educational need are also unlikely to explain the full scale of the change we observe.
In any case, it seems unlikely that this change in the composition of the school workforce was driven by robust empirical evidence, as there was little available at the time. Indeed, a body of empirical evidence developed over the 2000s showing the importance of teachers in the education production function (Rocko (2004); Rivkin et al. (2005) ; Aaronson et al. (2007); Slater et al. (2009) ) as well as evidence to suggest small eects of reducing class sizes (Krueger and Whitmore (2001) ; Angrist and Lavy (1999) ), though this nding is not universal (Hanushek (2003) ). There is less evidence on the eectiveness of teaching assistants.
The evidence that does exist suggests they have had relatively weak eects on pupil attainment (Blatchford et al. (2011); Farrell et al. (2010) However, it is important to acknowledge that increases and changes in school resources can be still be valuable even if they do not increase attainment (Cellini et al. (2010) ). Non-teaching sta could have helped schools achieve wider social objectives, such as improved behaviour, attendance or health. It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyse the extent to which non-teaching sta actually helped schools achieve such wider objectives.
A much more plausible explanation in our view is that the scale of the change is likely to have been driven by the various rigidities that schools face when making nancial decisions, as well as the the timing of funding allocations. Teachers in England are employed on relatively inexible contracts with national pay and conditions and a high nancial cost of redundancy. Furthermore, capital spending on such factors as an extra classroom is still the responsibility of local and central government, which might make it dicult for schools to employ extra teachers. Other sta such as teaching assistants and administrative can be employed on relatively exible, sometimes temporary, contracts. Non-stang inputs can also be changed at relatively short notice, with the exception of some running costs like energy expenditure.
The timing of funding allocations also seems likely to have increased the desirability of exible inputs.
School funding tends to be determined annually, giving schools little certainty with regard to their long-run budget, increasing the incentive to employ exible inputs. Moreover, the uncertainty with regards to future budgets may have created an incentive to engage in precautionary savings, which we observe in the form of surpluses on current budgets. This incentive is particularly strong in the present climate of expected (and uncertain) future cuts to public spending as well as planned reforms to school funding (which have not been set out in any great detail 15 ).
In summary, policymakers actively encouraged schools to make more use of non-teaching sta over this period in the belief that it could help achieve educational or wider social objectives, and changes in educational need may have required increased use of teaching assistants (such as greater numbers of pupils with English as an Additional Language). However, it is not clear that policymakers ever intended the scale of the shift we observe and it is unlikely to have been driven by robust empirical evidence, as little was available at the time. We believe that the main factors driving increased use of non-teaching sta and non-sta expenditures are the various rigidities and that schools face when making nancial decisions and the short-run nature of funding allocations that encourages greater use of exible inputs. Furthermore, schools are now likely to be better informed on the empirical evidence with regards to teachers and teaching assistants, but have yet to respond either in terms of sta composition or the way teaching assistants are used.
Conclusion
We have argued that a large part of the increased variation and targeting of school funding towards deprivation has mostly translated into higher quantities of non-teaching sta and non-sta expenditure. These choices are more likely to reect rigidities, the nature of contracts and the timing of funding allocations, rather than representing optimal responses to changes in the education production function. resource decisions, then they should seek to change the incentives schools face. Second, Academies have more exibility on pay and conditions of teachers than maintained schools do. It will be important to understand whether these extra exibilities have led academies to make dierence resource decisions. Sucient years of data will soon be available to permit such analysis.
Third, we have argued that uncertainty on future funding allocations can also sway resource decisions, both in terms of spending more on exible inputs and encouraging precautionary savings. This is in spite of this period being characterised by large increases in funding across all types of schools. If these increases had been fully anticipated, then resource decisions may well have looked dierent. The government has stated that it plans to reform the school funding system to make it simpler and rationalise allocations to schools and local authorities (and has already undertaken some reforms in this direction). However, there is signicant uncertainty as to what reforms will come in over the next few years. Such uncertainty seems likely to be encouraging schools to make greater use of exible inputs.
Finally, it will be important to understand what the implications of these resource choices have been for the attainment of dierent groups of pupils. To date, the UK literature on school resources have used quasi-experimental evidence to nd modest, positive eects of overall resources, largely focusing on the late 2000s. As we have shown, the changes in resources were probably even more dramatic over the early 2000s and after the coalition came to power in 2010. Furthermore, it will be important to understand whether dierences in actual input choices across have had dierent implications for pupil attainment. Stang Levels -2012-13 Teachers per 100 pupils 6.3 6.4 6.6 6.9 7.5 Teaaching Assistants per 100 pupils 1.3 1.7 1.9 2.2 2.7 Other Sta per 100 pupils 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.4 
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